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LUCIA V. SEC: THE DEBATE AND DECISION
CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SEC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Elizabeth Wang*
I. INTRODUCTION
A controversy has been brewing over whether or not the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s use of administrative law
judges is constitutional. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), passed on July 21,
2010, expanded the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”
or “Commission”) authority and ability to bring administrative
proceedings. Since then there have been growing allegations that the
use of these administrative tribunals is unconstitutional. In fact, the
SEC filed a record number of enforcement actions in the fiscal year
of 2016.1 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC2 represents the first federal
court ruling on whether administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are
employees of the SEC or rather inferior officers of the United States,
which would subject their appointment to the Appointments Clause
of the Constitution.3

* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.B.A., St. Louis
University, Missouri; B.S., Business Administration, Southwest Baptist University, Bolivar,
Missouri. I wish to thank Professor Elizabeth Pollman for her encouragement, patience, and
dedication in helping me along the way. Her guidance throughout the writing process and
unrelenting positivity created a formative learning experience for which I am deeply grateful. I
would also like to thank my husband, Jon, my in-laws, David and Darlene, my parents, Lyle and
Tina, and my tenacious sister, Sarah, for their love and support because without them law school
would have remained a dream.
1. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY
2016 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html (chart showing that
in 2016 there were 868 filings versus 807 in 2015, and 755 in 2014).
2. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
3. Thomas J. Krysa & Lawrence W. Treece, A Key Victory For SEC in
Battle over Administrative Courts, LAW 360 (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.law360.com
/articles/828028/a-key-victory-for-sec-in-battle-over-administrative-courts.
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In Lucia, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held Article II of the Constitution,4 which requires judges
be appointed by the President and affirmed by the Senate, is not
violated by the SEC’s use of ALJs, who are not appointed in this
manner. This Comment argues, in so holding, the Lucia Court
reached a decision that was both logical and reasonable.5 Since
Lucia, a circuit split has developed6 which has further highlighted the
importance of this issue and the need for the Commission to remain
concerned and take action to address the perception of unfairness and
lack of transparency, which caused the litigants to challenge the
SEC’s administrative forum use.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part II details the
background and history of legal issues surrounding the SEC and
other administrative bodies’ use of ALJs. Part III sets out the facts of
Lucia v. SEC. After analyzing the history and pertinent reasoning of
the court in Parts II and III, Part IV considers the implications of the
court’s holding in Lucia. Lastly, Part V concludes that the court
correctly ruled on the merits in the case against Lucia because ALJs
do not make final decisions or wield significant authority over the
SEC. Notwithstanding the merits of the ruling, however, this
Comment strongly encourages the SEC to take measures to improve
perceived unfairness and lack of transparency. This has become more
important in light of the circuit split created by the Tenth Circuit’s
recent ruling in Bandimere v. SEC.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF LEGAL ISSUES
A. SEC Creation and Authority to Use ALJs
Congress enacted the 1934 Exchange Act, a federal securities
law, with the aim of restoring public confidence in corporate
securities and the integrity of the stock market after the Wall Street
Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression.7 The Exchange Act
created the SEC to regulate exchanges, brokers, and over-the-counter
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“… Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the Heads
of Departments.”).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
7. Securities and Exchange Commission, HISTORY (2010), http://www.history.com/topics
/securities-and-exchange-commission.
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markets.8 Congress subsequently expanded the responsibilities of the
Commission; by 1960, the SEC administered six statutes including
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which bars fraudulent and
material misstatements of material fact made by investment
advisers.9 Then in 1961, President Kennedy designed a proposal to
provide “greater flexibility in the handling of the business before the
Commission, permitting its disposition at different levels so as to
promote its efficient dispatch.”10 Congress allowed the Commission
to delegate functions including “hearings, determining, ordering,
certifying, reporting or otherwise acting as to any work, business, or
matter” to an individual Commissioner, an ALJ, or an employee.11
The delegation, however, did not include the Commission’s
rulemaking authority, or right to review or intervene in an action, and
it preserved certain instances where the SEC’s review of an ALJ’s
decision is mandatory for adversely affected parties.12
The statutory scheme and legislative history show that
Congress’s goal was to grant the Commission “greater flexibility in
the handling of the business before the Commission [. . . and] relieve
the Commissioners from the necessity of dealing with many matters
of lesser importance and thus conserve their time for the
consideration of major matters of policy and planning.”13 As a result
of Congress acceptance of President Kennedy’s proposal, the
Commission gave ALJs the “authority to conduct administrative
hearings” and make “initial decision[s].”14 If the action does not
trigger a mandatory review, the ALJ prepares an initial decision
along with an order and the Commission can then either review the
initial decision on its own initiative or upon a petition, or if the
Commission subsequently decides not to conduct a review, then an
ALJ’s initial decision shall be deemed the action of the Commission,
but only after the Commission issues a finality order.15 No passage of
time will transform an initial decision of the ALJ into a final one;
even default rulings must be given a finality order by the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Lucia, 832 F.3d 277, 281, 290 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-21 (2016).
Id. at 281 (quoting 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1351, 1351-52).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 282.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 282.
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Commission.16 “Thus, the Commission must affirmatively act—by
issuing the order—in every case.”17
B. The expansion of the SEC’s power via the Dodd-Frank Act
The SEC may initiate an enforcement proceeding in two ways:
by bringing suit in federal court, or by filing an administrative
proceeding.18 In federal court, defendants have access to a jury trial,
independent judges, and deposition “testimony [that] is subjected to
the Federal Rules of Evidence.”19 Alternatively, administrative
proceedings are conducted before an ALJ, where there is no jury,
discovery is restricted, hearings proceed on a rapid schedule, and the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply.20
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the SEC’s power in
administrative proceedings in two ways.21 The Act expanded the
reach of the SEC as to against whom it can initiate an administrative
proceeding, and the Act increased the type and severity of penalties
that may be imposed through those proceedings.22
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, in the context of an administrative
proceeding, the SEC could only impose civil monetary penalties, and
only against an entity that was registered.23 These types of
proceedings included claims for insider-trading, securities fraud, and
unregistered securities.24
Dodd-Frank expanded the SEC’s jurisdiction from registered
individuals and entities to anyone who may have violated a securities
law.25 Before Dodd-Frank, the Commission had to go to district court
to take action against unregistered entities.26 After Dodd-Frank, the
agency’s administrative jurisdiction expanded “to anyone alleged to
have violated the securities laws, rather than only those registered
with the agency, essentially permitting the agency to pursue any
16. Id. at 286–87.
17. Id. at 286.
18. Id. at 282.
19. Joseph Grundfest, Fair or Foul? SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for
Reform Through Removal Legislation 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ.,
Working Paper No. 212, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695258.
20. Id. at 3–6.
21. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion of the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1164 (2016).
22. Id. at 1165, 1172.
23. Id. at 1170.
24. Id. at 1165.
25. Id.
26. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1165.
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remedy against unregistered defendants that it could pursue against
registered defendants.”27
While ALJs cannot punish a person by prohibiting him or her
from serving as an officer or director of a public company or forfeit
incentive or stock based compensations, ALJs can levy serious
penalties such as disbarment, which takes away the ability to practice
as a broker or accountant and essentially ends an individual’s
career.28 The Act increased the range of penalties the SEC can
impose on individuals and business entities that commit serious
violations.29 In addition to the civil penalties, the ALJ can issue an
order for disgorgement.30 Disgorgement refers to “the repayment of
illegally gained profits (or avoided losses) for distribution to harmed
investors whenever feasible”—“intended to deprive the wrongdoer
of ill-gotten gains.”31
An even more severe punishment, referred to by some in the
industry as the “equivalent of capital punishment,” is the SEC’s new
ability to impose “collateral bars,” the same sanction imposed on
Lucia,32 which goes further than disbarment and bans an individual’s
association with the entire securities industry.33 Before the DoddFrank Act, the SEC could bar a person from associating with the
securities industry sector he had previously associated with that led
to the charged misconduct, but not the securities industry in its
entirety.34
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts and Procedural History
The SEC initiated an administrative enforcement action against
Raymond Lucia and the Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc.,
asserting that Lucia’s “Buckets of Money” retirement wealth27. Id.
28. Id. at 1170.
29. Id. at 1170, 1172. Subsequently, the SEC adjusted the penalty to account for inflation in
accordance with the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015.
See Adjustments to Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts, 82 Fed. Reg. 5367 (proposed Jan. 18,
2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 201).
30. Zaring, supra note 23, at 1170–71.
31. Id. at 1171.
32. Lucia, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
33. Alexander I. Platt, SEC Administrative Proceedings: Backlash and Reform, 71 BUS.
LAW. 1, 7 (2016).
34. Id.
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management presentations violated the “anti-fraud provisions of the
Investment Advisers Act.”35 An ALJ found Lucia liable because he
made at least one material misrepresentation, and consequently
imposed a “lifetime industry bar” against Lucia.36 Thereafter, Lucia
petitioned the Commission to review the ALJ’s initial decision, and
further argued that the presiding ALJ was not appointed in
accordance with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution
(Appointments Clause).37 After an “independent review of the
record,” the Commission concluded its ALJs were not covered by the
Appointments Clause, and imposed the same sanctions as the ALJ.38
Lucia appealed the Commission’s decision and order to the D.C.
Circuit, arguing that the ALJ’s decision was invalid because the ALJ
was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.39 Thus,
the key question on appeal concerned the constitutionality of the
proceedings before the ALJ; if the ALJ were deemed an inferior
officer, there would be no need to consider Lucia’s challenge to the
liability and sanctions ruling.40
B. Holding and Reasoning
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that Commission
ALJs are not officers within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause, and thus, their appointment does not violate the
Appointments Clause. 41 As a result, the court did not have to grant
the petitioner’s request for review.42
Article II of the Constitution requires the President to appoint an
inferior officer who is then confirmed by the Senate.43 The Supreme
Court has explained that generally an appointee is an officer, and not
an employee who falls beyond the reach of the Appointments Clause,
if the appointee exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States.”44

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Lucia, 832 F.3d at 282.
Id. at 282–83
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 296.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
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In determining whether an ALJ has “significant authority,” a
Court considers three criteria: “(1) the significance of the matters
resolved by the official(s), (2) the discretion they exercise in
reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.”45 In
Landry v. FDIC, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the FDIC’s ALJs were
employees rather than inferior officers because, while they did
exercise “significant discretion,” they lacked final decision-making
authority.46 The FDIC regulations limited its ALJs to issuing
“recommended decisions,” and required the FDIC to consider and
decide every case.47
By contrast, in Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court
determined the special judges of the Tax Court were “inferior
officers” because they exercised “significant discretion” in carrying
out their duties and functions, so the agency was “required to defer”
to the special trial judge’s ruling unless it was clearly erroneous.48
In Lucia, the primary disagreement revolved around the finality
of the decisions issued by the SEC’s ALJs.49 Lucia agreed that a
finality order issued by the SEC could not change an initial order
from the judge into a “recommended decision.”50 But he argued that
because the Commission can choose not to order or grant a full
review of each case, the initial decision is essentially a final
decision.51
In siding with the SEC, the three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit
found it critical that under the SEC rules, an ALJ’s initial decision
could only become final upon an order of the Commission itself
through a “finality order.”52 The United States Code provides that
when the Commission does not review an ALJ’s action, it “shall for
all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed the
action of the Commission.”53 Lucia argued that based on the statute’s
wording, the ALJ issues final decisions for all intents and

45.
2012)).
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1133–34.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288 (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880–82 (1991)).
Id. at 285.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012).
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purposes.54 However, Lucia introduced no evidence that the
Commission simply “rubber-stamp[s]” the ALJs’ initial decisions.55
While the statute may permit this approach, it also authorizes the
Commission to establish its own delegation and review scheme.56
The SEC has the authority to delegate any of its functions—
including hearing, determining, or ordering a matter—to an ALJ.57
The Commission established its process to require action before an
initial decision becomes final.58 In doing so, the Commission
retained its discretionary right to review the action of any ALJ, and
while it could have chosen to adopt a regulation whereby the ALJ’s
initial decision becomes final, it did not.59
After an ALJ renders a decision, a petitioner may then seek to
appeal the decision by petitioning the Commission to grant review.60
After a petition is filed, the Commission decides whether or not to
review the ALJ’s decision, and take up the petitioner’s petition.61 If
the Commission decides not to take up the petition, the Commission
will issue a finality order which sets the date for when sanctions will
begin and includes a statement that it is not reviewing the initial
decision.62 “Until the Commission determines whether or not to
order review, [ . . .] there is no final decision that can be deemed the
action of the Commission.”63
However, the Commission cannot sit on either an appeal or an
initial order that is not being appealed and do nothing; it must make
an affirmative “final decision” in every case.64 No passage of time
can transform an initial decision into a final one.65 “The
Commission’s final action is either in the form of a new decision
after de novo review or, by declining to grant or order review, its
embrace of the ALJ’s initial decision as its own.”66 In any
circumstance, the SEC did not delegate any sovereign authority to
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Lucia, 832 F.3d at 285.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 285.
15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012).
See Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286.
Id.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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act independently of the Commission to the ALJs, nor has Congress
given them any power to act independently.67
IV. ANALYSIS
Administrative proceedings are far from uncommon amongst
regulatory agencies. To deem the SEC’s use of ALJs unconstitutional
would require the courts to undo years of legislation establishing the
creation and workings of the agency.68
This Part first addresses and supports the D.C. Circuit Court’s
ruling on the merits that the SEC’s use of ALJs does not violate the
Appointments Clause, and second discusses the work ahead for the
SEC.
A. The D.C. Circuit Court Ruled Correctly
The D.C. Circuit Court correctly ruled on the merits that the
SEC’s administrative proceedings, which are overseen by ALJs, are
constitutional. There is nothing in the regulatory history or precedent
that indicates the ALJ who presides over an administrative
enforcement hearing has been delegated significant authority to make
final decisions for the SEC.69 Further, the court’s ruling reflects
President Kennedy’s proposal that the SEC be “provid[ed] greater
flexibility in the handling of the business before the Commission.”70
In deciding how to best use the flexibility granted by Congress,
the SEC chose not to delegate final decision-making authority to
ALJs.71 The SEC is still required to “affirmatively act—by issuing
the order—in every case.”72 The SEC intended ALJs to act much like
a trial court—a court of first instance.73 The Commission’s retention
of final decision-making authority supports an ALJ’s ability to
perform fair trials and provide uncompromising rulings.
On December 27, 2016, in Bandimere v. SEC,74 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the D.C.
Circuit’s holding in Lucia and found the SEC’s use of ALJ’s to be
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
See supra Part II.
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 287.
Id. (quoting 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2151).
Id.
Id.
Zaring, supra note 23, at 1195.
844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
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unconstitutional.75 The Tenth Circuit held that SEC ALJs are inferior
officers rather than employees because they “exercise significant
discretion in performing ‘important functions’ commensurate with
the [special trial judges’] functions described in Freytag.”76 The
Bandimere court reasoned that the Supreme Court “has not equated
significant authority with final decision-making power.”77 Judge
Briscoe’s concurrence notes that final decision-making power “might
be sufficient to make an employee an Officer, [but] that does not
mean such authority is necessary for an employee to be an officer.”78
The SEC can petition the Tenth Circuit for a rehearing or a
rehearing en banc, or can petition the Supreme Court with a writ of
certiorari.79 A petition for rehearing en banc for Lucia is pending
before the D.C. Circuit because of the Bandimere ruling.80
While rehearing en banc and a grant of certiorari are rare, Judge
McKay’s dissent expressing concern that the Tenth Circuit’s decision
and interpretation of the Supreme Court’s precedent put “all federal
ALJs at risk of being declared inferior officers” may draw attention
to the circuit split and encourage review.81 It remains to be seen
whether Bandimere will discourage the SEC from choosing to pursue
enforcement actions in administrative court “at the same rate as in
the past several years[,] or whether [the Bandimere] decision
presages the SEC’s return to federal courts for the majority of its
cases.”82
B. The Work Ahead for the SEC
In light of the circuit split on the constitutionality of the SEC’s
use of ALJs, further court battles may lie ahead. This Comment has
argued that the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled on the issue in Lucia, and
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1179 (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
77. Id. at 1184.
78. Id. at 1192 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
79. Breon Peace, Darryl Stein, & Lisa Vicens, Cleary Explores Appeals Court Split Over
SEC
Administrative Cases,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
Blog
(Jan.
11,
2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/11/cleary-delves-into-appeals-court-split-over-secadministrative-cases.
80. Id.
81. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting).
82. Breon Peace, Darryl Stein, & Lisa Vicens, Cleary Explores Appeals Court Split Over
SEC
Administrative Cases,
CLS
BLUE
SKY
BLOG
(Jan.
11,
2017),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/11/cleary-delves-into-appeals-court-split-over-secadministrative-cases.
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this section examines the lingering concerns about the SEC’s
administrative proceedings and actions the Commission might take
to alleviate these concerns. Many scholars and litigants have raised
concerns of fairness over SEC enforcement proceedings.83 Most of
the consternation seems to stem from a lack of transparency and
perceived unfairness regarding the SEC’s forum selection process
and the ability to bring unregistered defendants into administrative
proceedings.84 Adjudication through an administrative proceeding
raises several problems, including the lack of procedural protections
for defendants in such proceedings, the increased penalties that an
ALJ may impose, and the prospect that the SEC will deliberately
bring an unresolved issue of securities law into administrative court
to gain an advantage of legal interpretation when it is at odds with a
federal court’s interpretation.
As Alexander Platt, an associate at Boies, Schiller, and Flexner
LLP, noted:
The problem is not (or not only) that the SEC has been
bringing more (and more important) cases in its home
forum, that the procedures in that forum are deficient per se,
or that the penalties available in that forum are draconian.
Rather, the problem it is that, unlike in the past, under the
SEC’s current enforcement architecture, procedural
protections are not commensurate with penalties.85
Professor David Zaring explains how these concerns grew after
the passage of Dodd-Frank, which “expanded the agency’s
administrative jurisdiction to anyone alleged to have violated the
securities laws, rather than only those registered with the agency,
essentially by permitting the agency to pursue any remedy against
unregistered defendants that it could pursue against registered
defendants.”86 Even the Wall-Street Journal has echoed concerns that
the SEC acts as both judge and prosecutor in administrative

83. See, e.g., Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, Chau v. SEC,
No. 15-461-CV, 2016 WL 7036830 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2016); Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503,
513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (Targets of SEC enforcement arguing that the unfair discrimination lies
in the selection of their case for administrative proceedings, while comparable cases go to federal
court).
84. Platt, supra note 33, at 38.
85. Id. at 37.
86. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1165.
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proceedings.87 These concerns are fueled not just by the Dodd-Frank
Act, but also by statements made by SEC Director of Enforcement,
Andrew Ceresney.88 In fact, a “dramatic shift can be seen in
enforcement venues for public company defendants.”89 From 2010
through 2013, the SEC brought more than 65 percent of its
enforcement actions against these defendants in civil court, whereas
in 2015 the SEC brought 76 percent of enforcement actions in
administrative court.90
The concern over procedural protections stems from the ALJ
serving as both the finder of fact, as opposed to a jury, and the finder
of law, as opposed to an independent judge, and also from the fact
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not apply in administrative proceedings.91 Instead, the
SEC’s own Rules of Procedure govern the courtroom.92
The perceived unfairness is compounded by the fact that
penalties are no longer commensurate with procedural protections (or
a lack thereof) in administrative courts.93 ALJs can now hand out
civil penalties that were previously only available in district court.94
While an ALJ cannot punish in precisely the same manner as a
federal district court judge (such as prohibiting a person from serving
as an officer or director of a public company), the Dodd-Frank Act
has increased the size and type of civil penalties available in the
administrative forum, incentivizing the SEC to bring more
enforcement proceedings into this forum.95 Taken together, the
87. See Russell G. Ryan, The SEC as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2014,
7:36
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge1407195362 (“[A] surge in administrative prosecutions should alarm anyone who values jury
trials, due process and the constitutional separation of powers.”); see also Stephen Bainbridge,
Should the SEC Be Prosecutor, Judge, Jury, and Executioner?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Oct. 21, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom
/2014/10/should-the-sec-be-prosecutor-judge-jury-and-executioner.html.
88. Grundfest, supra note 17, at 2 n.3 (“In late 2013, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew
Ceresney, stated, ‘[o]ur expectation is that we will be bringing more administrative proceedings
given the recent statutory changes [enacted through the Dodd-Frank Act].’”).
89. CORNERSTONE RES. & NYU POLLACK CTR. FOR L. & BUS., SEC ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITY AGAINST PUBLIC COMPANY DEFENDANTS: FISCAL YEARS 2010–2015
(2016), http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/SEC-Enforcement-Activity-AgainstPublic-Company-Defendants.
90. Id.
91. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1166–67.
92. Id.
93. Platt, supra note 33, at 43.
94. Zaring, supra note 21, at 1164, 1170.
95. See id. at 1170–72.
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problem is that unlike in the past, under the SEC’s current
enforcement architecture, procedural protections are not equivalent
to penalties.96
An additional concern stemming from another statement made
by Chairman Andrew Ceresney is that the SEC may start using the
administrative court to help the Commission substitute its
interpretation of federal securities laws for the views expressed by
the federal judiciary.97 Legal scholars are concerned that such use of
administrative proceedings will not lead to the same balanced,
careful, and impartial interpretations that would result from having
those cases brought before a federal district court.98
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Lucia only addressed the
constitutionality of the SEC’s use of ALJs, but it did not resolve
lingering concerns over the perceived unfairness and lack of
transparency regarding forum selection related to the SEC’s
enforcement proceedings.99
The SEC took certain steps to balance procedural protections
against increased remedies. The two changes the SEC announced
included doubling the amount of time it allows from filing an action
to the conclusion, and increasing allowances for discovery through
depositions.100 The adopted amendments to proscribe how the SEC
handles administrative proceedings only recently went into effect in
late September 2015.101 It is too soon to tell how these changes will
be received.
Regarding the discovery tools, the SEC expanded the discovery
rights for administrative proceedings.102 Traditionally, parties may
take depositions by oral examination only if a witness were unable to
attend or testify at a hearing.103 The recent amendments would allow
96. Platt, supra note 33, at 1.
97. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 8 n.21 (“If a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and
complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s
rules, it may make sense to file the case as an administrative proceeding so a Commission
decision on the issue, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development
of the law.”).
98. Id. at 8–9 n.21.
99. See generally Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
100. Platt, supra note 33, at 4.
101. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing
Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015209.html.
102. Platt, supra note 33, at 2.
103. Id. at 5.
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a maximum of three depositions in cases involving a single
defendant and a maximum of five depositions in cases involving
multiple defendants.104 The amendments also adopt a more liberal
timeline, allowing for up to eight months (instead of four) for a
hearing to begin after the filing of charges for complex cases. 105
Aside from what the SEC has already done, there are additional
actions the SEC needs to take. The SEC needs to provide greater
transparency in its data reporting, particularly regarding its exercise
of discretion in forum selection.106 The SEC has declared that there is
no “rigid formula,” but rather a “number of factors” it considers for
forum selection.107 This vague approach, coupled with the agency’s
proclamation that it will increase the use of administrative
proceedings, has raised concerns and continued claims of unfairness.
As Professor Joseph Grundfest argues, the agency could calm
concerns about forum selection by providing more detailed and
thorough sets of statistics regarding its filing choices and win-loss
ratios.108 There are statistics available regarding the quantity of SEC
enforcement filings, but there is not enough detailed information to
dissect how many of these filings are substantive versus clerical.109
This appears to be true for a variety of reasons. First, cases that settle
before filing are usually recorded as an administrative proceeding.110
Also, the agency registers “follow-on” proceedings and minor
actions such as delinquent filings as administrative proceedings.111
More detailed year-over-year reporting distinguishing between
matters that “must be brought as administrative proceedings or
federal civil actions from matters as to which the agency can exercise
discretion over the relevant forum” is needed.112
The imagined data would provide insight into currently
obscured areas of the Commission’s processes and decision-making.
104. Id. at 40.
105. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 15–16.
106. Id. at 11–12.
107. Platt, supra note 33, at 21.
108. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 11 (“Put another way, the Commission has not historically
reported its enforcement statistics in a manner that permits the accurate measurement of the
extent to which it exercises its discretion in favor of its internal administrative proceedings when
making its forum selection decisions. Nor do the agency’s data permit accurate analysis of the
factors that influence its forum selection decision.”).
109. See id.
110. Platt, supra note 33, at 11 n.57.
111. Id.
112. Grundfest, supra note 19, at 11–12.
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First, the data should distinguish among proceedings where the
agency exercised its discretion in forum selection, (as compared to
instances where a statute or another rigid factor dictates which forum
must be used). When the Commission is exercising its discretion in
which forum to bring an enforcement action the data should also
reveal whether the defendant is registered or unregistered.113
Additionally, the data should reveal the associated win-loss rates for
these adversarial actions, screening for the number and types of cases
that are required to proceed in administrative court by default or by
statute.114 Ideally, the data set will prove that as much as possible the
Commission is sending non-registered defendants to Article III
courts, and will reveal that the Commission is not hampering the
development of securities law by using administrative proceedings to
gain influence for its interpretation of debated issues.
V. CONCLUSION
The SEC is facing a crisis of confidence regarding the fairness
of its administrative proceedings. The Commission can respond to
these concerns by changing its internal policies and providing greater
transparency through reporting, which will bolster public confidence
that litigation matters are being properly sorted between
administrative and judicial forums. While these actions are advisable
for the SEC, the cries of concern do not undermine the D.C. Circuit
Court’s ruling that the Commission’s use of ALJs is constitutional.
ALJs are not inferior officers wielding significant authority because
their initial decisions have no way of becoming final decisions until
the SEC chooses to act. Notwithstanding the merits of the ruling,
however, and particularly in light of the Tenth Circuit’s recent
Bandimere ruling, it remains advisable for the SEC to take measures
to improve perceived unfairness and lack of transparency.

113. Id. at 10–11.
114. Id. at 12.
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